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Abstract
The European Semester is a challenge for national parliaments but also an opportunity to reform domestic oversight insti‐
tutions. Drawing on data from all member states, this study examines the conditions under which national parliaments use
this opportunity. Is Euro area membership a prerequisite for parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester and, if
so, which further combinations of conditions account for variation among Euro area countries? The analysis suggests that
membership in or close ties with the Euro area and institutional strength constitute necessary conditions for parliamentary
adaptation. Combined with other factors—in particular, public debt exceeding the Maastricht criteria—these conditions
explain reform in many cases. National parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester thus follows existing institu‐
tional divisions constituted by differentiated integration in the Euro area and uneven national parliamentary strength.
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1. Introduction
The European Semester is the process through which
the EU seeks to ensure member state compliance with
its macroeconomic and fiscal rules. Concerns have been
raised that this yearly cycle of coordination, monitoring,
and assessment, combined with significant enforcement
procedures, might curtail the authority of national par‐
liaments. The European Semester might thus lack input
legitimacy (Crum & Merlo, 2020; Dawson, 2015; Lord,
2017). In turn, it has been argued that national parlia‐
ments should prioritize attention to EU economic gover‐
nance (de Wilde & Raunio, 2018). Against this backdrop,
this study examines whether national parliaments adapt
to the European Semester by reforming domestic over‐
sight institutions, defined as rights and procedures to
scrutinize the government during the Semester process.
The question of whether national parliaments adapt
institutionally to the European Semester is rendered
complicated by the architecture of economic gover‐
nance and the diversity of existing parliamentary insti‐
tutions. Euro area integration is highly differentiated,
and the Semester’s implications vary accordingly across
countries. Yet, the literature on differentiated integra‐
tion has largely sidestepped any discussion of national
parliaments, and research on national parliaments has
hardly mentioned differentiated integration (for reviews,
see Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012; Winzen, 2021;
but see Genovese & Schneider, 2020). Specific research
on the European Semester, moreover, disagrees on
the effect of Euro area membership on national par‐
liaments (Hallerberg et al., 2018; Rasmussen, 2018).
Similarly, regarding existing institutions, it has been
argued that strong existing oversight in EU or budget
matters could encourage adaptation to the Semester
but also render Semester‐specific adaptation superflu‐
ous (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Kreilinger, 2018; Maatsch,
2017; Rozenberg, 2017, p. 45).
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My argument starts from the premise that national
parliaments consider institutional reform as a response
to changes in EU authority (e.g., Raunio & Hix, 2000).
The European Semester, in principle, constitutes an
opportunity for reform. However, two further points
can be made. First, differentiated integration means
that some parliaments are exempt from EU authority,
notably the Semester’s enforcement procedures, and
thus unlikely to consider reform at all. Euro area mem‐
bership and close institutional ties to the Euro area
(explained below) would thus constitute a necessary con‐
dition for parliamentary adaptation. Second, even mem‐
ber states for which the Semester is a significant reform
opportunity do not necessarily reform oversight proce‐
dures. Rather, existing institutions and other party politi‐
cal and economic conditions highlighted in the literature
(Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Raunio, 2005; Winzen, 2017)
might be required to motivate reform sufficiently.
Empirically, I examine data on European Semester‐
specific reforms of parliamentary oversight institutions
in all member states. A qualitative comparative anal‐
ysis (QCA) is used to assess which combinations of
conditions are necessary and sufficient for reform.
The main findings include that only a few parliaments
have implemented Semester‐specific oversight institu‐
tions. Euro area membership or close ties to the Euro
area via the Fiscal Compact and the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) are found to be necessary for reform.
Institutional strengths—defined by pre‐existing institu‐
tional rights in EU or budgetary matters—is another
necessary condition. These two explanations, combined
with a range of other factors, form several sufficient
configurations of conditions for reform. Public debt
exceeding the Maastricht criteria appears in several of
these configurations.
As discussed in the conclusion, these findings add
more specific evidence on the role of parliaments in the
European Semester than available so far. More broadly,
if input legitimacy is understood in terms of parliamen‐
tary oversight institutions, a key conclusion is that there
is cross‐national variation in the input legitimacy of the
European Semester. This variation reflects broader insti‐
tutional differences constituted by uneven parliamen‐
tary strength and differentiated integration. The con‐
clusion further highlights different perspectives on the
implications of this finding.
2. Challenges and Opportunities for National
Parliaments
In comparison to earlier fiscal and economic coordi‐
nation processes, the European Semester has stronger
procedures and enforcement mechanisms. As Table 1
shows, the EU conducts country‐specific monitoring of
Table 1. The European Semester: Process and enforcement.
Phase Key procedural steps Countries Legal bases




European Council economic priorities
Apr–Jun Plans & recommendations All ‘Six‐pack’ (2011).
Structural reform plans (‘National Reform Programs’)
Fiscal plans (‘Stability and Convergence Programs’)
Country‐specific recommendations by Commission
Council and European Council endorsement
Sep–Dec Budgetary coordination EA ‘Six‐pack’ (2011),
Assessment of draft budgets against SGP & CSRs ‘Two‐pack’ (2011),
Commission recommendations, Council debate Fiscal Compact (2013).
Enforcement Macro‐Economic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) Mixed ‘Six‐pack’ (2011).
Recommendations & Corrective Action Plan All
Non‐compliance judgment by RQMV All
Sanctions: Deposits and fines by RQMV EA
Enforcement Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) Mixed Art. 126 & 139 TFEU,
Policy recommendations All ‘Six‐pack’ (2011),
Decision on inadequate action (QMV) All ‘Two‐pack’ (2011),
Economic and Partnership Programmes EA Fiscal Compact (2013).
Enhanced surveillance & reporting EA
Sanctions by RQMV EA
Notes: EA: Euro area; RQMV: Reverse Qualified Majority Voting. Source: Own compilation based on the legal instruments cited in the
column ‘Legal bases’.
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macro‐economic conditions, requests reform and fiscal
plans before national budgets are presented to national
parliaments, and makes country‐specific recommenda‐
tions for compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) and macro‐economic stability goals. Euro area
member states additionally submit draft budgets for
EU scrutiny. EU recommendations for macro‐economic
reform and compliance with the SGP can be enforced
with a newMacro‐Economic Imbalances Procedure (MIP)
and a reformed Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which
can result in enhanced surveillance, financial deposits
and financial sanctions unless opposed by a quali‐
fied majority of member states. However, the sanc‐
tions only apply to the Euro area. Finally, since 2021,
to access funding under the EU’s Covid‐19 Recovery
and Resilience Facility, member states have to submit
reform plans reflecting country‐specific priorities iden‐
tified in the European Semester, which are then rated
by the European Commission in light of the European
Semester’s goals.
The challenges that the European Semester poses
for national parliaments have received significant atten‐
tion (Crum & Merlo, 2020; Dawson, 2015; Lord, 2017).
In brief, the concerns raised are threefold. First, the
rules accompanying the Semester, including the rein‐
forced SGP and the prescriptions of the Fiscal Compact,
create quasi‐constitutional constraints for the policy
choices available in parliaments and other arenas. Not
all observers agree that the wider economic governance
rules, such as the Fiscal Compact, should be treated
together with the European Semester. Yet, the Semester
process makes regular reference to these instruments
and integrates sanctioning mechanisms related to these
instruments. Second, the Semester creates new EU‐level
processes and activities, including reporting, delibera‐
tion and negotiation, and voting on economic perfor‐
mance from which parliaments are excluded, but regard‐
ing which they could demand improved oversight. Third,
the European Semester has repercussions for existing
parliamentary oversight. It requires various documents
and commitments from governments early in the bud‐
getary process, which they—in the shadow of poten‐
tial sanctions and funding decisions under the Covid‐19
response facility—could in turn cite to restrict the
scope of parliamentary budget decisions and to deflect
accountability to the EU.
There are, however, opportunities for national par‐
liaments to address these challenges. First, parliaments
have created the Interparliamentary Conference on
Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in
the European Union to ‘contribute to ensuring demo‐
cratic accountability in the area of economic gover‐
nance and budgetary policy in the EU, particularly in
the EMU’ (Interparliamentary Conference on Stability,
Economic Coordination and Governance in the European
Union, 2015, articles 2.1 and 4.2). Second, parliaments
can adapt domestic oversight institutions vis‐à‐vis the
governments in relation to the European Semester
(Hallerberg et al., 2018; Kreilinger, 2018; Rasmussen,
2018; Rittberger & Winzen, 2015). Whereas the effec‐
tiveness of the Interparliamentary Conference remains
debated, the second path, which is the focus here, is well‐
established in EU governance and might be relevant for
the European Semester as well.
3. Differentiated Euro Area Membership and
Parliamentary Adaptation to the European Semester
Can parliaments be expected to adapt domestic over‐
sight institutions to the European Semester? The litera‐
ture on national parliamentary adaptation to the EUhigh‐
lights conditions under which parliamentary actors—
mainly political parties—consider reforms of oversight.
This literature expects that changes in EU authority
encourage reformdiscussions, either because parliamen‐
tary actors belief that EU authority creates a democratic
deficit (Rittberger, 2003), or because they seek to avert
losses of their own authority (Benz, 2004; Saalfeld, 2005).
Yet, changes in EU authority do not necessarily result
in changes in oversight institutions but are best seen as
‘reform opportunities’ that enable but do not determine
change (Winzen, 2017, pp. 73–75). To understand parlia‐
mentary adaptation, we thus need to ask, first, whether
the European Semester constitutes a reform opportunity
and, second, which other factors might be required to
motivate reforms sufficiently. This section discusses the
first question.
At face value, the European Semester could plausi‐
bly be expected to trigger parliamentary reform debates.
While it remains contested whether the Semester
changes the distribution of authority between the EU
and the member states, it enhances the intensity of
economic policy coordination, creates new monitor‐
ing mechanisms, strengthens the enforcement of (rein‐
forced) economic and fiscal rules, and, since 2021, is
linked to financial incentives under the EU’s Covid‐19
response. Supranational institutions have also gained
some influence according to some studies (Bauer
& Becker, 2014; van der Veer & Haverland, 2018).
According to the standards of the literature (e.g., Börzel,
2005), these developments constitute an increase in
authority and a plausible reason for parliamentary actors
to examine the need for reform.
However, the literature on parliamentary adapta‐
tion has paid less attention to differentiated integration
(Holzinger & Schimmelfennig, 2012; Schimmelfennig
et al., 2015). Rather, changes in EU authority have been
assumed to be the same for all member states and,
therefore, not a promising explanation for cross‐national
variation. The literature on differentiated integration
highlights that this need not be the case as member
states might be exempted or excluded from EU author‐
ity in different policy regimes. By implication, the incen‐
tives for parliamentary actors to reform oversight insti‐
tutions might vary across member states. Genovese and
Schneider (2020) argue along these lines that Euro area
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parliaments faced greater pressure to enhance scrutiny
in response to the 2007–2008 financial crisis.
The European Semester is a prominent example of
variation in EU authority due to differentiated integra‐
tion. First, differentiation in Euro area membership is
closely linked with the authoritativeness of the Semester
process given that the main enforcement mechanisms
do not apply to countries without the Euro. Second,
some Euro area outsiders have close ties to the Euro.
Denmark participates in the ERM, with its currency
pegged to the Euro, and has ratified the Fiscal Compact.
This might lend the European Semester greater impor‐
tance in Denmark than in countries without the Euro.
Latvia and Lithuania also participated in the ERM before
adopting the Euro in 2014 and 2015. Additionally,
Bulgaria and Romania were not in the ERM in the
period covered here but ratified the Fiscal Compact fully
(Romania) or partly (Bulgaria).
Due to the differentiation of the Euro area, it seems
likely that parliamentary reforms will be considered in
only some member states. In the countries that are
subject to the most authoritative Semester processes—
notably, potential sanctions—parliamentarians have the
strongest reasons to examine the need for oversight pro‐
cedures due to both mechanisms emphasized in the
literature—to avert losses of authority and remedy per‐
ceived parliamentary deficits. Parliamentarians in coun‐
tries that are not in the Euro but have close ties to the
Euro area might also pay more careful attention to the
Semester. Even if they do not face sanctions themselves,
they have greater stakes in the policies of the Euro area
countries and might deem oversight over their govern‐
ments’ strategies during the Semester important. In con‐
trast, interest in parliamentary reform is likely to remain
limited in countries outside of the Euro area and without
close ties to it. In these countries, the Semester is not
entirely irrelevant but appears rather similar to EU soft
law processes, which have been found to raise little par‐
liamentary attention (de Ruiter, 2010).
4. Variation in Parliamentary Adaptation Within the
Euro Area
Wehave argued so far that the European Semestermight
enable reform discussions in the Euro area and closely
affiliated countries but might motivate reform suffi‐
ciently only in combination with other conditions. The lit‐
erature on national parliaments in the EU highlights
several possible conditions. The strength of pre‐existing
institutions has been seen as shaping the need for reform
where institutional deficits exist but also as constrain‐
ing the range of reforms considered appropriate by
domestic actors in light of institutional traditions (Benz,
2004; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001). In turn, Euroscepticism,
for example among governing parties, has been thought
tomotivate demands to protect and reinforce the author‐
ity of national parliaments (Winzen et al., 2015). These
general arguments might help explain parliamentary
adaptation to the European Semester. Additionally, since
the European Semester is about macro‐economic mon‐
itoring, the economic context of parliamentary reform
requires attention.
Two institutional conditions will be examined. First,
parliaments with strong rights in the domestic bud‐
getary process—the area most affected by the European
Semester—might extend their position to the Semester
process (Kreilinger, 2018; Maatsch, 2017; Rittberger &
Winzen, 2015). Parliamentarians of governing parties
accustomed to being formally consulted on budget deci‐
sions might seek to protect this prerogative. Strong bud‐
get rights could also lead parliamentarians across parties
to believe that the European Semester creates a demo‐
cratic deficit. Second, for similar reasons, parliaments
with strong oversight institutions in EU affairs might seek
to uphold this strong role in the area of economic gover‐
nance (Rittberger & Winzen, 2015). Yet, the implications
of institutions are not unambiguous. Some studies high‐
light that they might render adaptation to the European
Semester unnecessary. For example, the Finish parlia‐
ment concluded that existing EU affairs oversight mecha‐
nisms were sufficiently broad in legal and practical terms
to encompass the Semester (Kreilinger, 2018, p. 330;
Rozenberg, 2017, p. 45). The positions in the literature
are potentially compatible. Institutional strength might
make adaption to the European Semester possible—in
the sense of a necessary condition—but need not result
in reforms.
At the level of political parties, it has been argued
that parties opposed to the European Parliament or
European integration more generally are most likely to
demand strong rights for national parliaments (Winzen
et al., 2015). In the case of the European Semester, per‐
ceptions of the European Parliament might not mat‐
ter because this institution’s involvement in the process
remains limited (Crum, 2018; Fasone, 2014; Fromage,
2018). Yet, parties that oppose European integration
might see value in empowering national parliaments to
underline their belief that budgetary authority should
reside at the national level. Where Eurosceptic par‐
ties hold government authority, parliamentary adap‐
tation to the European Semester becomes a plausi‐
ble outcome.
Finally, parliamentary adaptation might depend on
a country’s economic situation (Genovese & Schneider,
2020; Kreilinger, 2018, p. 331; Rittberger&Winzen, 2015,
p. 443). The mechanism is that certain economic condi‐
tions put a country at risk of entering the MIP or EDP,
which implies enhanced monitoring and the possibility
of sanctions. This prospectmight enhance parliamentary
interest in oversight of the government’s conduct dur‐
ing the Semester including, for example, its efforts to
avert entering the MIP and EDP. Which economic condi‐
tions matter? The analysis here focuses on public debt.
The EDP depends on the Maastricht convergence crite‐
ria including public debt. The MIP relies on a broader
assessment in the context of the European Commission’s
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annual Alert Mechanism Report, but debt is one impor‐
tant indicator.
5. Data and Operationalization
This study analyzes data on national parliamentary over‐
sight institutions for the European Semester (Rittberger
& Winzen, 2015; Winzen, 2021). These data stem from
examining national constitutions, legislation, parliamen‐
tary rules of procedure, and other parliamentary doc‐
uments and, if primary sources were unavailable, aca‐
demic literature, to identify formal oversight institu‐
tions in national parliaments in relation to the European
Semester on a yearly basis. Parliamentary adaptation to
the European Semester can be divided into three cate‐
gories (Table 2). The first comprises parliaments in which
no specific oversight institutions have been created.
The second category captures selective reforms, such
as when parliaments are entitled to receive National
Stability and Reform Programmes before submission to
the EU, but no further rights or procedures exist. In these
parliaments, the rules of procedure and other sources
make only passing reference to the Semester. A typi‐
cal example is Austria, where existing legislation and
parliamentary rules of procedure rarely mention the
European Semester except that they require that the
Stability Programme is brought to the parliament’s atten‐
tion. The third group encompasses parliaments that
have created detailed oversight procedures and rights.
For example, the Danish parliament has created a com‐
prehensive ‘National Semester’ to mirror the European
Semester and to provide procedures for continuousmon‐
itoring of the government (Folketinget, 2013).
Table 3 summarizes the operationalization of the con‐
ditions employed in the analysis. The data used are in line
with previous studies. It should be noted, however, that
parliamentary budget authority proves challenging to
measure. An often‐used index by Wehner (2006), based
on OECD data from 2003, is now dated and misses 10 EU
member states (6 from the Euro area). The analysis here
relies on themore recent OECD Parliamentary Budgeting
Practices Database (OECD, 2018). The OECD surveyed
Parliamentary Budget Officials from 34 countries to spec‐
ify characteristics of the budgetary process. For this
study, relevant questions were selected and aggregated,
as detailed in Appendix 1 in the Supplementary File, to
form an index of parliamentary budget authority. A key
advantage is that this measure includes all but 6member
Table 2. Adaptation of parliamentary oversight institutions to the European Semester.
Category Description
No reforms (0) No or minor oversight institutions.
Moderate reforms (0.5) Oversight procedures and rights in some steps of the European Semester. Typically,
parliament receives the Stability/Convergence and Reform Programmes at the same
time as or before the EU.
Strong reforms (1) Extensive governmental reporting obligations or participation in decisions on
important documents.
Source: Adapted from Rittberger and Winzen (2015) and Winzen (2021).
Table 3. Operationalizing the conditions in the analysis.
Condition Explanation
Euro area membership. Formal membership in the Euro area.
Close ties to the Euro area. Countries that are in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) or ratified the Fiscal
Compact fully or partly.
Oversight institutions in EU affairs An index of EU‐specific oversight institutions including the existence of European
(Winzen, 2012, 2021). Affairs Committees, a formal role of sectoral committees, obligatory explanatory
memoranda, a scrutiny reserve, and mandating rights. Range: 0–1.
Parliamentary budget rights An index of parliamentary rights and resources in the budgetary process created
(OECD, 2018). based on the OECD Parliamentary Budgeting Practices Database. Appendix 1 in
the Supplementary File explains the operationalization in detail.
Government support for the EU Seat‐weighted average of government party leaderships’ orientations towards
(Bakker et al., 2015, 2020; European integration based on Chapel Hill Expert Surveys. Range: 1 (strongly
Polk et al., 2017). opposed)‐7 (strongly in favor).
Public debt (Eurostat). Government consolidated gross debt as percentage of GDP.
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states and all but 3 (Cyprus, Malta, and Lithuania) from
the Euro area.
The data on adaptation to the European Semester
and the remaining conditions will be examined descrip‐
tively with a focus on trends and bivariate relationships
as well as in a QCA (explained below). For the QCA,
the continuous variables have to be dichotomized. The
mean was chosen as a threshold for EU oversight insti‐
tutions, government EU support, and budget authority.
The mean divides the data relatively evenly. In the case
of budget authority, it also coincides with the largest
gap in the data. For public debt, 60 percent was set
as the threshold, which reflects the Maastricht conver‐
gence criteria.
6. Bivariate Relationships
Figure 1 charts parliamentary adaptation to the
European Semester over time. 12 parliaments imple‐
mented moderate to strong reforms between 2011, the
first year of the data, and 2020. All but one reform—in
Greece after the country exited the EU’s financial aid
and conditionality program—occurred in the first years
of the Semester, suggesting that a state of institutional
stability might have been reached. The overall picture is
one of limited institutional adaptation with reforms in a
minority of member state parliaments.
How does parliamentary adaptation relate to the
possible explanations? Examining bivariate relationships
first, it appears that 53 percent of Euro area mem‐
bers compared to 22 percent of countries without the
Euro had seen parliamentary reforms by 2019 (Figure 2).
In addition, the only countries outside of the Euro area
that implemented reforms—Denmark and Bulgaria—
have close ties to the Euro area via the ERM or Fiscal
Compact. What might be most interesting, considering
the arguments examined here, is that Euro areamember‐
ship and close ties to the Euro area together constitute a
jointly necessary (but not sufficient) condition for reform.
No reforms are observed in countries lacking member‐
ship or close ties. Yet, reforms are not always observed
in countries with these characteristics.
Figure 3 examines relationships between the other
conditions, averaged from 2011–2019, and European
Semester adaptation of national parliaments in 2019.
Parliaments with strong EU affairs oversight institu‐
tions appear to have adapted most to the European
Semester, although this relationship is quite tentative.
For example, the Finish and German parliaments have
strong oversight institutions but no specific Semester
rights and procedures. The Greek and Portuguese par‐
liaments implemented some Semester‐specific reforms
despite having comparatively weak EU affairs institu‐
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Figure 1. Parliamentary adaptation to the European Semester since 2011. Notes: The figure shows parliamentary adapta‐
tion to the European Semester averaged over member states and highlights all observed reforms; The trend rises in 2020
because the United Kingdom (a parliament without formal oversight institutions for the Semester) left the EU.
Euro area member states Member states without the Euro 
ES oversight instuons                              
FR IT LT SI AT EE EL LV NL PT BE CY DE ES FI IE LU MT SK DK BG CZ HR HU PL RO SE UK 
Figure 2. Parliamentary adaptation inside and outside of the Euro area in 2019. Notes: The color scheme encodes the
values in Table 2: Dark blue = 1; Light blue = 0.5; Red = 0; Countries without the Euro but with close ties to the Euro area
via the ERM or ratification of the Fiscal Compact are underlined. Source: Adapted fromWinzen (2021).
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Figure 3. European Semester adaptation in 2019 and explanatory conditions. Notes: The vertical axis shows adaptation to
the European semester by 2019: No reforms (0), Moderate reforms (0.5), Strong reforms (1) (see Table 2); The horizontal
axis shows average values of the conditions for 2011–2019.
European Semester adaptation to go together with bud‐
get rights. The overall picture is one of relatively ambigu‐
ous relationships. We can also examine relationships
between the dichotomized conditions (see previous sec‐
tion) and adaptation to the European Semester to detect
whether their presence or absence might be necessary
or sufficient for parliamentary reforms. Yet, this is not
case for any individual condition (see Appendix 2 in the
Supplementary File).
7. Paths to Adaptation Within the Euro Area and
Closely Linked Countries
The previous section suggests that membership in the
Euro area or having close ties to the Euro area is nec‐
essary for the creation of oversight institutions in the
European Semester. Yet not all parliaments that meet
this condition adapt to the Semester. This section focuses
on configurations of conditions that might explain par‐
liamentary adaptation sufficiently. To this end, a QCA
is presented, which groups cases based on their char‐
acteristics and searches, based on Boolean algebra, for
combinations of characteristics that are sufficient for the
outcome (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Focusing on the Euro
area and countries with close ties (given the absence of
reform elsewhere), the outcome of interest is whether
parliaments have at least some oversight institutions by
2019. The conditions are as described in the data and
operationalization section.
The first step in a QCA is the truth table which
shows the cases and configurations of conditions in
the analysis (Table 4). Except for two deviant cases—
Denmark and Spain—the table is free from contradic‐
tions. At the same time, most configurations are spe‐
cific for one or two countries suggesting that paths
to European Semester adaptation are relatively idiosyn‐
cratic. At first sight, this impression appears to be con‐
firmed in Table 5, which shows minimally sufficient con‐
figurations for the positive (moderate or strong oversight
institutions) and negative outcome, obtained by mini‐
mizing the truth table. We observe several, often com‐
plex configurations. Moreover, many conditions appear
in paths to positive and negative outcomes, and they do
so if they are present and absent.
However, careful examination of Table 5 suggests
important insights. Regarding the positive outcome, all
paths involve strong institutions in EU affairs or the bud‐
get process (albeit not necessarily both). Further analysis
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Table 4. Cases and configurations in the analysis.
Oversight institutions Budget rights Pro‐EU gov’t High debt Outcome Cases
1 0 1 0 1 EE, LV
1 0 0 1 1 NL
0 1 0 1 1 EL
1 1 0 1 1 IT
1 0 1 1 1 SI
0 1 1 1 1 (C) 1: AT, FR, PT. 0: ES.
1 0 0 0 0 (C) 1: DK. 0: FI, SK.
0 0 1 1 0 BE, IE
0 0 1 0 0 LU
1 1 1 1 0 DE
Note: Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta are excluded due to missing data on parliamentary budget rights.
(not shown) confirms that parliaments that lack institu‐
tional strength in at least one of these two areas do not,
without exception, adapt institutionally to the European
Semester. Thus, institutional strength—defined as strong
rights in EU affairs or the budget—is another necessary
condition for reform besides being in the Euro area or
close to it.
A second finding is that debt, combined with insti‐
tutional strength, and, possibly, reinforced by rather
Eurosceptic governments (in Italy and the Netherlands),
forms a sufficient path to reform in many cases. A pos‐
sible interpretation is that reform depends on favor‐
able institutional conditions and the enhanced moni‐
toring and enforcement prospect that stems from high
debt. The interpretation of the third combination—
institutional strength and pro‐EU governments—is less
clear, however, as pro‐EU governments have more com‐
monly been seen as source of weak parliamentary adap‐
tation to European integration.
Concerning the negative outcome, two conclusions
can be drawn. First, as strong EU affairs institutions or
budgetary rights are necessary for reform, their joint
absence (i.e., institutional weakness) is by implication
sufficient for the absence of reform. This implication
(which can be confirmed in further analysis of the data)
fits the path of Belgium, Ireland, and Luxembourg. It also
implies that the third condition, pro‐EU governments,
can be eliminated from this path. It likely only remains
as a result of the limited diversity of observed configura‐
tions. There is thus a sufficient path of institutional weak‐
ness explaining the lack of parliamentary oversight insti‐
tutions for the European Semester.
Second, the paths to no reformalso underline the lim‐
its of the institutional argument. Institutional strength is
necessary for reform and institutional weakness is suffi‐
cient for no reform, but institutional strengths is unam‐
biguously not sufficient for reform. This is in line with
arguments highlighted earlier about the Finish parlia‐
ment, which deemed reform unnecessary in light of the
existence of a strong oversight system (Kreilinger, 2018;
Rozenberg, 2017). The absence of debt might further
explain the lack of reform in Finland (as well as Slovakia).
The German case seems most puzzling given strong EU
and budget institutions and noteworthy debt. One inter‐
pretation might be that such strong institutions, possibly
reinforced by pro‐EU governments, render reformunnec‐
essary even if high debt enhances the prospect of enter‐
ing the Semester’s enforcement mechanisms.
One might ask whether selecting alternative or addi‐
tional conditions would lead to different results. Given
the limited membership of the Euro area, it should
be kept in mind that adding conditions quickly exacer‐
bates ‘limited diversity’ (unobserved configurations) and
idiosyncrasy (all cases described by their own configu‐
rations). Yet, some key questions can be explored. First,
opposition rather than governing parties might be deci‐
sive. However, replacing government with opposition
EU support (the seat‐weighted, average EU position of
Table 5. Results of the QCA.
Positive outcome Cases
Oversight * ~budget * Pro‐EU govt EE, LV, SI
Oversight * ~pro‐EU govt * Debt IT, NL
~oversight * Budget * Debt AT, FR, EL, PT. Inconsistent: ES.
Negative outcome Cases
~oversight * ~budget * Pro‐EU govt BE, IE, LU
Oversight * ~budget * ~pro‐EU govt * ~debt FI, SK. Inconsistent: DK.
Oversight * Budget * Pro‐EU govt * Debt DE
Notes: Bold font denotes that a condition is present; The ‘~’ symbol and italics denote the absence of a condition.
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all opposition parties, dichotomized at the mean) cre‐
ates three evenly split, inconsistent configurations (not
shown). Focusing on the opposition thus reduces our
ability to distinguish parliaments that did or did not
adapt to the European Semester.
Furthermore, the focus on debt as economic indi‐
cator could be criticized. The budget deficit holds an
equally important place in the European Semester.
Moreover, experience with EU conditionality in an ESM
program might encourage parliamentary adaptation.
Table 6 shows QCA results with the budget deficit replac‐
ing public debt as a condition. First, the main findings
remain unaffected. For the positive and negative out‐
comes, the configurations are identical except for the
debt and deficit conditions. A fourth path to the posi‐
tive outcome, which however overlaps strongly with the
third, is added but does not change the above conclu‐
sions regarding the relevance of institutions. However,
whereas debt and institutional strength were found to
form sufficient configurations in some cases, this is not
consistently the case for the deficit. In general, the pres‐
ence as well as the absence of excessive deficits is com‐
patible with positive and negative outcomes. Second,
Table A5 in the Supplementary File shows QCA results
with past participation in an ESM program added as a
condition. However, this analysis largely results in con‐
figurations in which the ESM condition, in its presence
or absence, is simply appended to the previously found
configurations, suggesting that it does not add to our abil‐
ity to distinguish or systematize parliamentary reactions.
This is likely due to the small number of countries hav‐
ing experienced an ESM program and the overall limited
number of Euro area member states and countries.
8. Conclusions
Ever since the start of the European Semester, schol‐
ars have raised concerns about the input legitimacy
and potentially detrimental effects of this process on
national parliaments (Crum & Merlo, 2020; Lord, 2017).
The goal of this study has been to examine whether
national parliaments address these concerns by adopt‐
ing Semester‐specific reforms of their domestic oversight
procedures and rights. The focus was on whether Euro
area parliaments might be more likely to adapt to the
Semester and what might explain variation among Euro
area countries. It was found that parliamentary adap‐
tation to the European Semester has remained mixed
with only some countries seeing reforms. In this respect,
the picture remains similar to the early days of the
Semester (Rittberger & Winzen, 2015). Overall, parlia‐
mentary adaptation to the European Semester reflects
existing divides related to differentiated integration and
uneven institutional strength.
The analysis suggests new findings. First, two nec‐
essary conditions for reform were identified: Euro area
membership and institutional strength. Together, these
two conditions explain the lack of reform in 9 of (by 2019)
28 member states. Cyprus and Malta were excluded due
to lack of data on budget rights, but it is often thought
that these parliaments have weak institutions. If so,
the absence of adaptation to the European Semester
in these countries could possibly also be explained as
above. This finding contributes new evidence to previ‐
ous, albeit more behavioral, studies that disagree on the
effect of Euro area membership (Hallerberg et al., 2018;
Rasmussen, 2018).
Second, interpreting the effect of institutional
strength in terms of necessity helps to resolve dis‐
agreement in the literature. Existing institutions might
motivate reform, as commonly argued in the litera‐
ture on national parliaments in the EU (Benz, 2004;
Dimitrakopoulos, 2001), but might also render reform
unnecessary, as indicated in the literature on the
European Semester (Kreilinger, 2018; Rozenberg, 2017).
This tension can be resolved if we think about existing
institutions in terms of necessity. If parliaments lack
institutional strength—evidenced by a lack of oversight
procedures and rights in EU and budget matters—the
path to adaptation to the European Semester is blocked.
In contrast, if strong EU or budget oversight exists, adap‐
tation becomes possible. Yet, whether reforms then
occur, as in 9 countries, or not, as in Finland, Germany,
and Slovakia, depends on further factors.
Third, the results regarding sufficient configurations
for reform are more ambiguous. It appears that possible
Table 6. Results with the budget deficit instead of debt as a condition.
Positive outcome Cases
Oversight * ~budget * Pro‐EU govt EE, LV, SI
Oversight * ~pro‐EU govt * ~deficit DK, IT, NL. Inconsistent: FI.
~oversight * Budget * Deficit FR, EL, PT. Inconsistent: ES.
~oversight * Budget * Pro‐EU govt AT, FR, PT. Inconsistent: ES.
Negative outcome Cases
~oversight * ~budget * Pro‐EU govt BE, IE, LU
Oversight * ~budget * ~pro‐EU govt * Deficit SK
Oversight * Budget * Pro‐EU govt * ~deficit DE
Note: Bold font denotes that a condition is present. The ‘~’ symbol and italics denote the absence of a condition.
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exposure to the Semester’s enforcement procedures in
countries with high debt might be sufficient for reform
if institutional conditions are favorable. Yet, in several
cases our ability to explain reform remains partial. These
cases include Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia, where institu‐
tional conditions are favorable, but it is not obvious what
else motivated reform. Two deviant cases (Denmark
and Spain) also remain. Regarding Denmark, Rasmussen
(2018, p. 350) explains that parliamentarians grew dissat‐
isfied with deficits of existing oversight mechanisms and
specific Commission recommendations after two cycles
of the European Semester and adopted more tailored
rules. This is plausible, but it remains unclear from a
comparative perspective why the same outcome did not
obtain in, for example, Finland or Germany. Potentially,
the compatibility of Commission recommendation with
domestic policy preferences might play a role.
What are the wider implications? To begin with, if
parliamentary oversight institutions are seen as indi‐
cator of input legitimacy, the results suggest a dif‐
ferentiated assessment of the input legitimacy of the
European Semester. Within the Euro area, where the
impact of the Semester is potentially highest, some insti‐
tutionally strong parliaments have taken measures to
adapt. Some parliaments have not implemented reforms
but already have strong EU affair or budgetary rights.
In contrast, the parliamentary deficit of the European
Semester is clearest in the case of Euro area countries
with institutionally weak parliaments. These parliaments
are exposed to the Semester process and enforcement
mechanisms but have not addressed domestic institu‐
tional weakness. Outside of the Euro area, parliaments
have refrained from reforms, probably because the rele‐
vance of the European Semester without potential sanc‐
tions is ambiguous. Whether recent links made between
the European Semester and the EU’s Covid‐19 response
facility might change this pattern remains to be seen.
Whether the results indicate wider challenges
beyond the European Semester can be debated. In an
optimistic reading, they might imply that parliaments
reform adequately given existing institutions and vari‐
ation in the EU‐level challenges that they face. In a
more pessimistic reading, the results might imply that
the deepening of integration widens the asymmetry
between different parliaments within the Euro area and
between the Euro area and less integrated countries (see
also Benz, 2013; Rittberger &Winzen, 2015). Some stud‐
ies, including recent literature on the European Semester
(Papadopoulos & Piattoni, 2019), consider the limited
involvement of (some) domestic actors such as parlia‐
ments in the EU as a normative and practical challenge.
Finally, it could be seen as a challenge that differen‐
tiated integration seems to lead to wider differences in
howdomestic institutions develop. A common argument
is that differentiation, as practiced today, protects the
unity of the EU’s core institutions, both formally and in
practice (Adler‐Nissen, 2009; Dyson & Marcussen, 2010;
Schimmelfennig & Winzen, 2020). This might reduce
the true gap in exposure to EU policymaking between
insiders and outsiders and could facilitate a return to
uniform integration. It does not seem to be the case,
however, that differentiation also preserves similarity
in how domestic institutions engage with EU policy‐
making—rather, by reducing the relevance of EU pro‐
cesses for some member states, differentiated integra‐
tion also reduces incentives for institutional adaptation.
Domestic actors such as parliamentariansmight thus end
up less engaged—and, to the extent that engagement
might foster support, less likely to support a return to uni‐
form integration. These behavioral conjectures remain to
be studied systematically, however.
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